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Surveillance is an inherent feature of modern society: It involves activities of state 
institutions such as secret services and the police that monitor criminals, political 
activists, enemies of the state, as well as companies that track workers, customers, and 
competitors (Ball, Haggerty and Lyon 2012; Fuchs 2011, 2013a; Lyon 2007). 
Surveillance’s purpose is not only to collect data, but also to use this data to exert 
social control. The rise of consumer culture and computing have in the 20th century 
brought about some qualitative changes of surveillance so that it has become more 
networked, ubiquitous, focused on everyday life and consumption, and organised in 
real time.  
 
In June 2013, Edward Snowden revealed with the help of The Guardian the existence 
of large-scale Internet and communications surveillance systems such as Prism, 
XKeyscore, and Tempora. According to the leaked documents, the National Security 
Agency (NSA) in the PRISM programme obtained direct access to user data from 
seven online/ICT companies: AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Paltalk, 
Skype, Yahoo!1. The Powerpoint slides that Edward Snowden leaked refer to data 
collection “directly from the servers of these U.S. Service Providers”2. Snowden also 
revealed the existence of a surveillance system called XKeyScore that the NSA can 
use for reading e-mails, tracking web browsing and users’ browsing histories, 
monitoring social media activity, online searches, online chat, phone calls, and online 
contact networks, and follow the screens of individual computers. According to the 
leaked documents, XKeyScore can search both meta- and content-data3.  
 
The documents that Snowden leaked also showed that the Government 
Communications Headquarter (GCHQ), a British intelligence agency, monitored and 
collected communication phone and Internet data from fibre optic cables and shared 
such data with the NSA4. According to the leak, the GCHQ for examples stores phone 
calls, e-mails, Facebook postings, and the history users’ website access for up to 30 
days and analyses these data5.  Further documents indicated that in co-ordination with 
the GCHQ, also intelligence services in Germany (Bundesnachrichtendienst BND), 
France (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure DGSE), Spain (Centro Nacional 
de Inteligencia, CNI), and Sweden (Försvarets radioanstalt FRA) developed similar 
capacities6. 
 
                                                        
1 NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others. The Guardian Online. June 7, 
2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data  
2 Ibid.  
3 XKeyscore: NSA tool collects “nearly everything a user does on the internet’. The Guardian Online. 
July 31, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data  
4 GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world’s communications. The Guardian Online. 
June 21, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-
communications-nsa?guni=Article:in%20body%20link  
5 Ibid.  
6 GCHQ and European spy agencies worked together on mass surveillance. The Guardian Online. 
November 1, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/01/gchq-europe-spy-agencies-
mass-surveillance-snowden  
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The study presented in this paper is set in a British context. Snowden’s revelations 
were first published in the British broadsheet newspaper The Guardian and therefore 
received high public attention in this country, which makes a study conducted in a UK 
context particularly relevant. As in many other countries, Britain has also experienced 
intensification and extension of surveillance after 9/11. This development has been 
based on governments’ assumption that an augmented and expanded use of 
surveillance technologies can detect and prevent terrorism.  
 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 extended government bodies’ 
capacity to monitor society, buildings, vehicles, telephone communication, Internet 
communication and postal communications. After 9/11, this Act was amended 
multiple times in order to extend surveillance power. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005 introduced the possibility of control orders that can ban citizens suspected of 
terrorist activities from undertaking certain activities or can put them under constant 
surveillance. After the London bombings that took place on July 7, 2006, the 
Terrorism Act 2006 was introduced. It enabled the police to detain suspected terrorists 
for up to 28 days without raising criminal charges. The EU Data Retention Directive 
mandated that communications corporations store all meta-data of communications 
for at least six month and a maximum of 24 months. After the European Court of 
Justice had found that this Directive violated the right to privacy, the UK Parliament 
passed the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 in order to keep up data 
retention in the UK. In November 2015, the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill was 
published. It aims at extending the government capacities for targeted and mass 
surveillance of communications.  
 
What is the British public’s opinion towards Snowden’s revelations? A survey 
conducted by Angus Reid Global in 2013 showed that 60% of the 2,000 British 
respondents thought that Edward Snowden was a hero. They argued that he should be 
commended for letting the public know that governments are running electronic 
surveillance programmes that threaten people’s privacy7. 64% said they did not trust 
the British government to be a good guardian of citizens’ personal information. In a 
2014 survey, the polling company Ipsos Mori found that 85% of the 1,958 British 
respondents said that it was essential or important that their Internet browsing 
behaviour remains private8. A YouGov poll9 conducted in 2015 showed that 72% of 
the respondents familiar with the Snowden revelations distrusted that the police 
responsibly deals with data it gathers from the Internet. 51% distrusted intelligence 
services and 69% the Home Office and ministries.  
 
Various scholars have worked on the critical analysis of Internet and social media 
surveillance (Andrejevic 2007, Andrejevic 2013; Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund and 
Sandoval 2012; Fuchs and Trottier 2013, Mathiesen 2013, Trottier 2012, Trottier 
2014, Trottier and Fuchs 2014). Given the intensification and extension of 
surveillance and law and order-politics after 9/11 (Ball and Webster 2003, Chomsky 
2011, Lyon 2003, Mathiesen 2013, Rockmore 2011), Snowden’s revelations did not                                                         
7 More Canadians & Britons view Edward Snowden as “hero” than “traitor”, Americans split. 
AngusReidGlobal. October 30, 2013. http://www.angusreidglobal.com/polls/48837/more-canadians-
britons-view-edward-snowden-as-hero-than-traitor-americans-split/  
8 One year after Snowden drops NSA bomb, UK citizens demand more privacy. RT Online. May 30, 
2014. http://rt.com/news/162496-nsa-gchq-snowden-internet/  
9 https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/08/21/peering-through-prism-authorities-should-always-ob/  
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come as a surprise. Secret services’ Internet monitoring uses forms of Deep Packet 
Inspection surveillance that have existed before Snowden’s revelations (Fuchs 
2013b). What came however as a surprise for many is the extent and dimension 
Internet surveillance has taken on. We can therefore without a doubt assert that 21st 
century information society is not just a capitalist society, but also a mass surveillance 
society.  
 
The task of this paper is to study how data and computer professionals think about 
commercial and state surveillance of the Internet and social media in the age of 
Edward Snowden. It reports the findings of focus group research that was conducted 
in London in 2014, a year after Snowden’s revelations. It is of particular interest to 
interrogate how data and computer experts think about Snowden and surveillance 
because they are the type of professionals who best understand how digital 
surveillance works technologically. They are themselves frequently confronted with 
issues concerning the processing of personal data, privacy and data protection. 
 
Section 2 briefly discusses literature about surveillance after Snowden. Section 3 
explains the study’s empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the main findings. 
Section 5 provides an overall interpretation and draws conclusions. 
 
2. Surveillance after Snowden 
 
The Snowden revelations have become an important topic in the study of public 
opinion, privacy and surveillance, Internet communication, journalism and the public 
sphere. 
 
First, there have been studies concerned with public opinion. Bakir, Cable, Dencik, 
Hintz and McStay (2015) report the findings of several empirical studies attitudes on 
surveillance after Snowden in Britain and the EU: In the UK and the EU, there are 
especially concerns about deep packet inspection (DPI) Internet surveillance 
(compare Fuchs 2013b for a critical analysis of DPI Internet surveillance). In the UK, 
especially younger people and ethnic minorities are concerned about state 
surveillance. All age groups, but especially citizens older than 55, are concerned 
about commercial surveillance. 
 
Based on a Pew survey of attitudes towards surveillance in the USA, researchers in 
China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and Taiwan conducted 
similar quantitative surveys and compared the results. In the US survey, 45% of the 
respondents said in 2014 that Snowden’s revelations served the public good, whereas 
43% said they caused harm. 56% said that the US government should prosecute 
Snowden10. Adams, Murata, Fukuta, Orito and Palma (2015) conducted an 
international comparison of the results. With the exception of Japan, a very clear 
overall majority of respondents in the other countries agrees that Snowden’s 
revelation serve the public good. In Japan, the degree of agreement to questions about 
whether the respondents would emulate Snowden’s actions was lowest. Agreement 
was in contrast very high in Spain, Mexico, and New Zealand.    
 
Second, there have been analyses that focus on the Snowden revelations from the                                                         
10 http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/20/obamas-nsa-speech-has-little-impact-on-skeptical-public/  
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perspective of privacy and surveillance. David Lyon (2015a) has published the book 
Surveillance after Snowden, in which he argues that Snowed revealed how “[b]ig 
government and big business” (Lyon 2015a, 13) together carry out mass Internet 
surveillance. The revelations also show that secret services co-operate internationally 
in data exchange and surveillance, as for example the five eyes partnership of secret 
services in the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand shows (Lyon 
2015a, 8). Fuchs (2015b) argues that Snowden’s revelations further support the 
conclusion that concepts of participatory and democratic surveillance are mistaken. In 
the post-Snowden era, it would be clear that we need a critical theory of surveillance. 
 
David Murakami Wood and Steve Wright (2015) edited a special issue of the journal 
Surveillance & Society on the theme “Surveillance and Security Intelligence after 
Snowden”: Garrido (2015) argues that a focus on the global political economy of 
surveillance is necessary after Snowden. van der Velden (2015) classifies the 
surveillance technologies used by the NSA and other secret services as devices that 
leak data and devices that are inserted into networks for collecting data. Keiber (2015) 
says that the Snowden revelations display the US hegemony in surveillance. Schulze 
(2015) with the example of the German government argues that the Snowden case 
shows that denial, the delegation of responsibility, rationalisation, authorisation, 
singularity, and securitisation are ideological strategies that governments use for 
legitimatising surveillance. As Murakami Wood and Wright indicate, these 
revelations point to only the most recent attempt by several governments to “attack 
the basis of what makes the Internet creative and free, in the name of all kinds of 
‘risks’ (mainly terrorism, identity cri e, intellectual property crime and paedophilia)” 
(2015, 135).  
 
Third, there have been analyses of the Snowden revelations that stress the dimension 
of Internet communication. Lyon (2015b) argues that post-Snowden, the Internet and 
big data should be key focuses in the analysis of surveillance. He writes that “the 
Snowden revelations raise as a key issue the future of the internet” (Lyon 2015b, 
147). Vincent Mosco (2014, 7) argues that the Snowden revelations show the rise of a 
military information complex that “promotes the power of a handful of companies 
and the expansion of the surveillance state”. Fuchs (2015b) makes the point that 
Snowden’s revelations show the existence of a surveillance-industrial Internet 
complex, in which capitalist and state interests partly converge. “In the surveillance-
industrial complex, the world’s most powerful state institutions have collaborated 
with the world’s most powerful communications companies to implement totalitarian 
surveillance systems” (Fuchs 2015b, 8). Lyon (2014) argues that Snowden has shown 
the existence of a form of big data surveillance in which state and corporate agents 
play a role. Hintz (2014) says that the Snowden affair has demonstrated the crucial 
role that social media corporations play in policing the Internet. 
 
Fourth, there have been studies that focus on the Snowden revelations from the 
perspectives of journalism and the public sphere. Glenn Greenwald (2014), one of the 
journalists who covered the Snowden revelations in The Guardian, wrote the book No 
Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State. He argues 
for example that the Snowden affair shows that the purpose of whistle-blowing, 
activism and engaged political journalism is to promote “the human capacity to 
reason and make decisions” (Greenwald 2014, 253). 
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Scherman (2014) argues that Snowden’s revelations show the relevance of civil 
disobedience today. Chadwick and Collister (2014) analyse the role of The Guardian 
as news organisation in the Snowden revelations. Qin (2015) shows that mainstream 
news media tend to frame Snowden as traitor and social media users as hero. Petley 
argues that the fact that the conservative press in Britain argued for prosecuting The 
Guardian shows that these media are not watchdogs, but part of the Establishment. 
Branum and Charteris-Black’s (2015) discourse analysis of how the British press 
reported the Snowden affair confirms Qin’s result. In respect to the role of the public 
in responding to Snowden’s revelations, research has also given attention to aspects of 
activism (Bauman et al. 2014, Haunss 2014). 
 
3. Empirical Research Methodology 
 
The research presented in this paper was conducted as part of a European Union 
project, in which one of our tasks was to study how experts assess privacy and 
surveillance. Our specific case study focused on Internet and social media 
surveillance. We chose to conduct focus groups (for a methodological overview, see: 
Bryman 2012, chapter 21) with data and computer experts in London. Internet 
surveillance has been intensively discussed in the British public after Snowden 
revealed the role of GCHQ in mass surveillance. Some people consider London the 
world capital of surveillance due to its extensity of CCTV11. The Silicon Roundabout 
in East London has made the city an important hub for the computer and Internet 
industry in Europe. Likewise, Google’s decision to build its £1 billion, 2.4 acre 
headquarters in Central London ensures that the city retains this status12. London is 
therefore particularly suited as the location for a case study on digital surveillance 
after Snowden.  
 
We first developed a focus group guide that gave special significance to three topics: 
ethics and societal impacts of Internet surveillance, Internet surveillance in the light of 
Edward Snowden’s revelations, and political responses to contemporary digital 
surveillance. The logic of choosing these three major topics was that we first wanted 
to know how computer professionals think about commercial and state surveillance in 
general independent of Snowden. Second, based on this general discussion, we 
wanted to engage the participants in conversations about the implications of 
Snowden’s revelations. And third, given that we took a critical research approach, the 
question arose what could be done politically against mass surveillance. The focus 
group guide is documented in the appendix to this paper. 
 
A pre-test was conducted in early August 2014 with two computer science experts. It 
resulted in some improvements of the focus group guide.  
 
We invited digital data and computer experts to two focus groups that were conducted 
on September 8 and 9, 2014, at the University of Westminster in Central London. We 
defined “digital data and computer experts” as individuals whose working lives 
involve a significant amount of processing of personal data in digital form. Digital 
data experts are either people working in the computer and Internet industry as 
                                                        
11 See for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOIfzj5k8HA  
12 http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/17/google-uk-headquarters-kings-cross 
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developers, managers, consultants, or technology officers or researchers who have 
studied computing and/or the Internet. 
 
For sampling, we developed a list of 200 Internet and IT businesses that are 
headquartered in London. We searched for contact e-mails and phone numbers, 
contacted these businesses, and asked if we could get in touch with computer 
professionals working for them in the areas of privacy, data protection and security. In 
addition, we identified 20 mailing lists to which computer scientists, computer 
experts, and computer professionals are subscribed. This way of establishing contacts 
ensured that we only reach computer experts as potential participants. Sampling took 
place from the middle until the end of August 2014 by e-mail and telephone. The 
contacting and sampling process was continued until we had found 16 participants 
who volunteered, that is 8 for each focus group. We expected that some of those who 
agreed to participate would have to drop out in the last minute. Therefore we recruited 
more participants than required. Some participants indeed had to drop out, resulting in 
5 participants in each of the two focus groups, which was our target size. Out of the 
10 participants, four were digital data researchers and six worked in the digital data 
industry. Four women and six men participated.  
 
Participants were asked to sign an informed consent form, by which they agreed that 
we recorded the focus groups and quoted from them in publications. We have 
anonymised all participants’ names and institutional affiliations for this report. Table 
1 provides a general overview of the focus group participants as well as their IDs (e.g. 




Profession Organisation, organisation 
type 
P1 Computer ethics expert  University 
P2 Computer science student University 
P3 Chief operations officer Company that is a global 
provider of Internet, voice 
and video services 
P4 Founder of a wireless community 
project 
Wireless community project  
P5 Consultant on privacy, data 
control and security; researcher 
Non-profit initiative 
P6 Founder of an ICT consultancy Company that provides 
business IT services 
P7 PhD student in Internet studies University  
P8 User experience consultant Single-person company 
P9 Social scientist, who has been 
involved in research about social 
media  
Research institution  
P10 Chief Technology Officer Company that provides 
online advertising solutions 
Table 1: An overview of the participants in the 2 focus groups 
 
Both focus groups lasted around 2.5 hours, which resulted in a corpus material of 5 
hours as input for the analysis. We partially transcribed the data based on the audio- 
and video-recordings. The resulting data was used as input for a text analysis. We 
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conducted this analysis with the help of topical coding, a qualitative method of data 
analysis, in which each category represents an important theme in the material 
(Bryman 2012, 578-581). Thematic coding structures and in turn facilitates thematic 
analysis. As participants are considered experts and have different backgrounds and 
professional duties, we opted to present findings on an individual basis, rather than 
collapse them into quantified statements. As much as possible, we present key 
findings in the words of these experts. 
 
The participants were asked to fill out a quantitative feedback questionnaire at the end 
of the focus group. On average, the participants considered themselves to have 
relatively high knowledge about privacy and data protection (mean=4.1, scale: 1=I do 
not have much knowledge of privacy and data protection issues … 5=I consider 
myself a privacy and data protection expert), which confirms that we had indeed 
invited computer and data experts.  
 
4. Internet Surveillance in the Age of Edward Snowden: The Results of 2 Focus 
Groups 
 
The focus groups had three major topics: 
1) Privacy and surveillance in online advertising and the information economy as a 
case example for surveillance in general and ethical and societal dimensions of the 
Internet;  
2) Edward Snowden’s revelations about state surveillance of the Internet; 
3) Political responses to mass Internet surveillance. 
 
The reason for the focus on both commercial and political surveillance is that 
Snowden’s revelations uncovered that in mass Internet surveillance major 
transnational companies such as Facebook and Google, for whom targeted online 
advertising is an important business mechanism, collaborate with secret services, 
which calls forth the question of what political responses are feasible. Snowden’s new 
revelation is the existence of a surveillance-political-industrial Internet complex, in 
which big data business and big state institutions collaborate.  
 
4.1. Corporate Surveillance in Social Media Advertising 
 
The participants identified and discussed three issues that in their view were of 
particular concern for understanding the ethics of online advertising: 
1) The contradiction of economic interests and the protection of employees, 
customers, and users’ data. 
2) Ideologies and complexity in the context of explicit consent given to online 
companies’ processing of personal data. 
3) The distinction between opt-in to VS. opt-out from targeted advertising.  
 
The first issue is that there is a lack of concern among companies and little technical 
knowledge among users. Participant 6 (P6), who is founder of an ICT consultancy 
firm, said for example: “Very few people actually have the technical competence to 
be fully aware of all the consequences what they do on their devices and how easy it 
is to pull it out”. P3, who is chief operations officer in a global communications 
company, argues that there is a strong lack of data protection in companies: ”Most 
SMEs don't have any way to deal with sensitive personal data. They don't have any 
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procedures in place. They don't have any technical ability to deal with it. […] They 
just lock the data up. Anything they might come across – they just store it. Probably 
unencrypted. […] Also now more in the cloud”.  
 
The same participant says that also in respect to data retention, there are often 
problematic practices. S/he mentions the example of HR records: “The minute you 
leave that job, your employer should destroy it. And nobody does it”. P6 reports from 
experience with clients that those who are under the jurisdiction of data processing 
and protection acts, “ignore it completely”. P6 also discusses the example of 
solicitors: “They got vast amounts of historical data. What they would really want to 
do is to have all of the historical data in a sort of internal Google where they can 
search for everything that is relevant. So when I tell them they really can’t do that and 
I rant before them, they are very irritated. Until I point to the solicitors’ Law Society, 
which also says they can’t do it. And then they have to conform”.  
 
The participants agree in principle that data protection and privacy laws are very 
important. Some of them point out specific examples of how capitalist reality 
contradicts data protection because companies have a vast appetite for and economic 
interest in collecting, storing, analysing, and keeping data on employees and 
customers. The focus group contributions indicate that economic surveillance seems 
to be an inherent feature of capitalism that contradicts employee and consumer 
privacy. Although laws are in place, they according to the focus group participants are 
hardly enforced so that the state tends to mainly support capitalist interests and does 
not support consumer and employee privacy.  
 
A second issue of discussion was explicit consent to the processing of personal data, 
especially sensitive data. The UK Data Protection Act (and similar regulations in all 
EU countries) regulates that users must give “explicit consent” to the processing of 
sensitive personal data that concerns racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or other beliefs, trade union membership, health conditions, sexual life, 
alleged or committed criminal offences (Article 2, Schedule 3).  
 
The research participants criticise the complex, vague, euphemistic, and ideological 
language often used in online platforms’ privacy policies. P1, a computer ethics 
expert, refers to such practices as “cleverly worded things” that one has to read 
multiple times to grasp. P3 argues: “Most consent documents and end user licenses 
are so convoluted anyway. Did you actually ever read an end user license agreement? 
The whole thing?”. P5, a privacy consultant and researcher, points out that if Google 
changes its privacy policy, it assumes users automatically consent. This participant 
holds the view that this is not a true form of consent: “There is no real consent. They 
[Google] are very weak on this side of the argument”.  
 
P3 argues that privacy policies and questions if one accepts changes of it, often use 
loaded and deceptive questions and language that compel users into agreeing: “’Do 
you want us to make your experience better by tracking you?’ […] 99% will go: Of 
course I do because it makes my experience better. […] Or: ‘Do you want to improve 
your search experience by enabling search history?’ ‘Do you want to improve your 
location access services?’”. Such questions mask the intention of these services 
because they do “not tell you that they are going to track everything you do”. 
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P2, a computer science student, points out that consent is often not real consent 
because the alternative to not agreeing is to not use the technology: “Sometimes we 
don’t want any of our information to be stored, but we just have to click on ‘yes’”, 
otherwise the service cannot be used. P2 said about the language used in privacy 
policies: “It’s really vague, so making it simple would really be good”. 
 
P5 points out the complexity of data processing and consent in networked computing 
systems such as the Internet: “How do you know what people consent to? What is 
explicit consent? […] The individuals need to be more in control of their sensitive 
data”. Other participants add that the issue of consent and legal responsibility has 
been further complicated by the fact that companies and individuals increasingly store 
data in the cloud. They also stress that data’s contexts change over time. P6: “Several 
of our clients are moving over to the cloud. […] Microsoft is now being sued by the 
American government so that the information that is stored in the EU13, in Ireland, 
should be given by Microsoft, which is an American company, to the American 
government, without European consent. And my solicitors have started waking up to 
the issues here and were wondering what on earth to do about the Microsoft cloud 
because they got an awful lot of client data in it”. This respondent concludes by 
stating that Microsoft Cloud users effectively “have no privacy”. P4, who founded an 
open wireless community network, identifies data collection in various contexts as 
risks because “increasing amounts of dimensions of data are now stored on us”.  
 
Further complexity is added to the question if users consent to the processing of 
sensitive personal by the circumstance that meta-data can reveal a lot of personal data, 
including sensitive data. P7, a PhD student in Internet research, argues: “From a 
relatively small amount of data you can infer with very high accuracy most of these 
categories of sensitive personal data. And that may be done in a way that may not 
even personally identify people, but you might be able to categorise someone with 
such a high degree of accuracy. […] Sensitive data is then not collected in the first 
place, it is just inferred from statistical ones”. P10, who is chief technology officer 
(CTO) in an online advertising company, talks about “the amount of data that we as 
individuals are transmitting […] just because we have mobile phones”. He sees this 
data explosion as the most pressing issue because of the possibility for retrospective 
identification.  
 
P4 provides an example of how meta-data can reveal a lot of sensitive personal data: 
“If you go to a mosque twice a day, and it is on GPS, at certain times of the days. 
Does that come under the religious believes and should be protected? How indirect 
does the information have to be to be sensitive personal data?”. P1 adds another 
example of identifying people’s religion or ethnicity based on CCTV footage. 
 
P9, who is a social scientist in a research institution working a lot with personal data, 
argues that there is a difference between the way social scientists and online 
companies deal with data. The difference would be that social scientists first specify 
what data they collect and they ask for permission, whereas on the Internet “people 
just provide all sorts of data without being asked. And then that can be used and 
analysed and conclusions can be drawn from that. It’s much harder to determine what                                                         
13 See: http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/microsoft-and-other-tech-giants-fight-u-s-right-to-seize-
cloud-data-1.2677688  
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makes that person identifiable and what information it is that makes them 
identifiable”. 
 
The participants generally feel that the way online companies obtain consent is often 
purely pseudo-consent, insufficient, and relying on deceptive and ideological 
language. They also have the overall impression that data protection laws do not 
reflect the complexity of online data processing caused by cloud computing, the 
global networking of data in the context of national data protection acts, meta-data, 
and changing contexts of personal data. As experts in this area, they are able to 
identify risks in current technologies based on professional experience as well as 
extrapolations from formerly unknown surveillance practices that Snowden and other 
whistle-blowers have revealed. Most participants’ conclusion is, however, not that 
data protection is therefore outdated, but rather that it does not adequately protect 
users today and should be brought up-to-date.  
 
A third important discussion topic was if there should be opt-in to or opt-out from 
targeted online advertising. It was the most controversially discussed issue in our 
focus groups.  
 
Data protection experts and the advertising industry tend to hold different opinions on 
this issue: The Article 29 Working Party is a group of data protection commissioners 
and experts set up by the European Union. It publishes opinions and 
recommendations about privacy and data protection issues, including a 2010 report on 
online advertising14. Its view is that any users do not know about opting-out and that 
opt-out it does not amount to real consent because passivity of the user does not 
necessarily imply agreement. Active participation is therefore required for expressing 
agreement. The Article 29 Working Party concluded that ad network providers 
“should swiftly move away from opt-out mechanisms and create prior optಣin 
mechanisms” (23) and that mentioning “the practice of behavioural advertising in 
general terms and conditions and/or privacy policies can never suffice” (24).   
 
The advertising industry tends to have a different, opposing opinion. So for example 
the European Advertising Standards Alliance and the Interactive Advertising Bureau 
argue that opt-in approaches are “disruptive for users”15 and that such mechanisms 
“are not of comparable privacy value to users” and can have “severe negative 
economic impact on a legitimate business activity”16 of advertisers. The ad industry 
prefers opt-out from targeted ads or no opt-in or opt-out at all. 
 
P6, founder of an ICT consultancy who finds data protection issues to be of crucial 
importance, argues: “Opt-in. […] It has to be opt-in. Things ought to be set that they 
are by default secure. Otherwise you are making decisions for people. […] The 
default start has to be default secure. I don’t think there is any other way it can be 
done if you are responsibly looking after people. Obviously, if the industry does not                                                         
14 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 




16 IAB Europe and EASA: Letter to Article 29 Working Party. January 17, 2012. 
http://www.iabeurope.eu/download_file/977/211    
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like that, it worries about its income. […] The default should be that one is opted out. 
That is my view”. P7 supports P6’s view: “For a certain category of settings there 
should always be opt-in because there are certain things that are categorically about 
security and categorically in the interest of the individual”. This participant argues 
that there should be opt-out in some cases, where the basic functionality of an online 
platform would otherwise not be possible. 
 
P8, who is a user experience consultant, also expresses some doubts about the privacy 
of targeted advertising, but adds that one has to think about how opting out effects 
user experience: “My gut feeling is that if I have to opt out of everything, there will 
be a lot of additional interaction”. A problem would also be the complexity of 
explaining opt-in: “But how easy is it to explain what you are opting into? […] So it 
is the complexity of explaining to people what you are opting into and what could be 
done with it”.  
 
P10, who is the CTO of an online advertising company, supports P8’s concerns about 
the convenience of usage: “The challenging part is how to convey that [opt-in 
information] in a way that is easy for consumers, for an end-user who has not an idea 
of what technology means, does not want to go through a hundred options or 200 
options because they want something much easier but at the same time gives an 
amount of flexibility for advertisers to work with that user”.  
 
P10 adds that opt-in can have very negative impacts for companies: “They 
[representatives of the advertising industry in an example] mentioned about the 
immense economic impact that it would have on the Internet, the technology, not just 
the advertisers themselves, but the entire Internet. You need to think about what 
powers the Internet? […] It’s advertising. Advertising makes it possible for all of us 
to consume services like Google Search. It allows us to connect to other people on 
Facebook. Facebook exists not because it is a benevolent entity of the connected 
people, it is doing that for advertising. It is the same thing with Twitter and e-mail. 
Why is it free for all of us? Why is information freely accessible as well?”  
 
P7 responds to P10 and points out that the capitalist and targeted-ad model of the 
Internet is not the only possibility: “I agree that this is definitely how things work at 
the moment. But it would be a shame if every good that was produced in the economy 
would completely be holding to the current business model. We can imagine lots of 
different ways that all sorts of goods might be funded. And historically this is what 
has happened. […] So it would be a shame if we were to limit how run the Internet 
just based on its current most accepted model”. P6 adds that in the earlier days of the 
Internet there was no advertising and things worked well. In referring to his 
experiences online in the late 1980s, he states that “[a]t that time there was no 
advertising on the Internet. We had perfectly working search engines and they all 
worked quite well. I agree this has changed completely. The difficulty is it is now 
being dominated by a group of American organisations who are in the capitalist part 
of the world dominant in every way. […] Many of the things around the ideas of 
privacy and what is not private, these are strictly Western hemisphere ideas”.  
 
P9 adds to the discussion the question how relevant ads are in the case of opt-in and 
opt-out: “And if I do opt out for Google to use those search terms wouldn’t the 
adverts be just more random? Say I look for restaurants in London and I get constant 
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adverts from Pizza Express but I hate Pizza Express, that’s a nuisance. But if I am 
opted out, then I might get results for restaurants in Swansea, which might be even 
less relevant to my sort of interest if I search the Internet”. While non-targeted ads 
would be “less relevant”, this statement also identifies targeted ads as largely 
ineffective as well as “a nuisance”. 
 
P10 argues: “Targeting advertising is the better option compared to non-targeted 
because if you get non-targeted advertising, an advertiser is wasting a lot of money 
because every time you show a person an ad, the advertiser incurs a cost”. P6 strongly 
disagrees and argues that one has to see that capitalism is the context of advertising 
and that the question is in what kind of society we want to live in: “But what I don’t 
want is to be targeted for adverts when I am not looking for products. And that is the 
default setting. […] It doesn’t matter how much you turn off the search terms in your 
browser, your search history has been captured by Google, every detail of it is known 
and audited, and so forth. […] It seems to me the whole issue here is what’s the 
relationship between capitalism and society. […] The defaults of society have to be to 
protect people. Otherwise, what’s the point?”  
 
This discussion is a very good example of discourses about advertising’s advantages 
and disadvantages for individuals and society (see: Pardun 2014). A typical pro-
advertising argument that could also be found in the focus groups is that advertising 
allows free and cheap access to culture, technology, and media and that without it, 
Internet, culture, and the media could not exist. Critics hold that such an argument 
confuses the dominant reality of the Internet and culture with how it could be 
different, i.e. the essence and potentials of the media world and its capitalist reality. 
Specifically, some of our focus group participants pointed out that there once was an 
Internet without advertising that worked and that there are non-advertising-based and 
non-commercial applications and platforms on the Internet. Some participants pointed 
out that opting into advertising might result in less convenience and a more difficult 
user experience. Further arguments in favour of targeted ads were that targeted ads 
would be more relevant than non-targeted ones and that opt-in would result in a waste 
of advertisers’ money. The critics of online advertising pointed out that the issue at 
hand is a much larger one, having to do with capitalism and society and the question 
if we want to live in a society that is dominated by capitalism and advertising or if we 
shouldn’t create alternatives to it and social spaces that are free from advertising and 
commodity logic.  
 
The focus group participants’ discussion showed nicely the range of diverse opinions 
and controversies about online advertising. The vast majority of people living in 
Western societies are confronted with different forms of advertisements every day. 
Advertising’s ubiquity adds to the fact that discussions about its pros and cons tend to 
be fairly controversial. Whereas some think it lowers prices, gives helpful information 
to consumers, is all about liberal consumer choice, and that also children are 
sovereign consumers, others hold that it increases prices, tries to manipulate 
consumers, fosters the concentration of markets and the media, advances stereotypes 
and sexism, harms children, advances a surveillance society and the exploitation of 
employees and consumers, and fosters the financialisation and therefore proneness of 
the economy to crisis and bubbles. Our focus group showed that these controversies 
have in the age of the Internet and social media gained even more importance. 
Targeted advertising is at the heart of the capitalist Internet model that dominates 
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today. It is a capital accumulation model that some cherish as a new form of 
consumer choice and business opportunity, whereas others detest it as a form of 
manipulation and the colonisation of the lifeworld by commodity logic. Such 
controversies are an indication that social and ideological conflicts and struggles are 
at the heart of contemporary Internet politics.  
 
Carol J. Pardun’s (2014) book Advertising and Society presents controversies around 
advertising in such a form that a pro-advertising argument is opposed to a counter-
argument. One chapter focuses on Facebook and social media. It shows that academic 
controversies about targeted online ads follow the same line of controversy as our 
focus groups. Whereas Joe Bob Hester argues in the pro-position that targeted online 
advertising “greatly reduces waste” (of money, time, attention) (in: Pardun 2014, 
165), is “more relevant” (167), enables interfaces that are “less cluttered by 
advertising” (167) and “services free of cost to users” (167), Tom Weir holds against 
Hester that targeted ads are a “violation of individual privacy” (170), that they 
confirm an Orwellian vision of society (173), and that they display how freedom 
reduced to ownership and consumption turns into slavery (173). One can add to 
Weir’s argument that theories of audience labour and audience commodification in 
the age of social media hold that the users of corporate social media constitute a class 
of unremunerated and exploited digital workers who produce value and a data 
commodity that is sold to advertisers (Fuchs 2014a, 2015a; Fuchs, Boersma, 
Albrechtslund and Sandoval 2012; Fuchs and Sandoval 2014, McGuigan and 
Manzerolle 2014). Both the academic debate and our empirical research confirm the 
controversial and antagonistic nature of social media advertising. 
 
4.2. Edward Snowden and State Surveillance of the Internet  
 
The second discussion topic was how participants think about Edward Snowden’s 
revelations and secret services’ state surveillance of the Internet with the help of 
systems such as Prism, XKeyscore, or Tempora.  
 
Being asked if they feel Snowden is a hero or a villain, the clear majority view of our 
focus group participants is that he did the right thing. P1 claims that Snowden “made 
a valuable contribution in coming out with” the revelations. Likewise, P10 says that 
”[h]e has certainly done something heroic by revealing to the world what’s happening 
and just bringing that in front of people’s minds so that they are reading about it and 
they are considering that governments can be evil. […] He is always gonna be a target 
for the Americans”. P7 also agrees that Snowden is a hero, adding that “[t]here’s this 
very complex world that very young people like Snowden are the experts on, for the 
most part. And a security community, people with experts in governments, clearly are 
not going to understand it. That disconnect kind of struck me at the time, seeing some 
of the discussion in the media and so on”. 
 
Some participants hold more ambivalent views about Snowden’s actions. P2 says: “I 
think he did the right thing, but not in the appropriate way. […] He could have done it 
in a different way”. P6 disagrees: “The question is if he could have done more to 
bring it to the authorities in America. It looks like the answer is ‘no”. In that case he 
has put his own life on the line, which makes him fairly heroic looking”. P8: “Who 
knows what his motivation was. […] But it seems like this was a way out of a 
situation, which seems to be unjust and this was the only way he could talk about it. 
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[…] I think that’s something that lots of people have a right to know”. 
 
The above findings indicate that the vast majority of participants feel Edward 
Snowden has done the right thing, even though he thereby broke US law, and that his 
revelations have been important for uncovering the extent of online mass surveillance.  
 
Being asked how they feel about Snowden’s revelation that the NSA, GCHQ, and 
other security agencies conduct large-scale surveillance of online communications, 
most participants express that they are outraged, that surveillance has gone too far, 
and that we live in a mass surveillance society with totalitarian potentials. They 
express a sense of urgency that things have to change. 
 
P3 says: “It changed a lot, although many people suspected there were things like that 
going on. It really changed our belief in our security services being the white hats 
[ethical computer hackers] vs. the black hats [unethical computer hackers]. […] The 
NSA are malicious hackers and just like any other malicious [...] hackers and they do 
not follow the law necessarily. […] And the magnitude and the question whether we 
think the government is interested in specific data: I think they are interested in all 
data. […] They collect everything”. P4 expresses a desire to participate in a collective 
response to these practices: “I believe that such access to surveilled data at the 
moment it is high and I wish to convince as many people as I can to be part of 
something that questions that”. 
 
The participants problematize warrantless surveillance that treats everyone as a 
terrorist until proven innocent and installs a system of categorical suspicion. P6 states 
that “[t]here is nothing new about monitoring. Anybody in the tech industry knows 
about Tinkerbell […], which enables the government to monitor any telephone phone 
call in Great Britain. […] The difficulty for them was that they could not monitor 
every phone, they had to target. […] I don’t think many people object to the idea of 
targeting criminals, murderers, rapists, etc. […] The difficulty is feature creep and the 
ability with the speed of technology – […] tens of billions of operations per second – 
means you can monitor tens of billions of people. You can monitor everything they do 
at all times as a general process. And it is still easier to monitor everyone than it is not 
to”.  
 
Based on the above, P6 is especially concerned with “the feature creep: when it 
moves from begin a socially agreed consensus that certain behaviour should be 
monitored and discouraged to a political background, that people are being targeted 
for their political beliefs or their threat to the stability of the state not through 
terrorism, but through their opinions”. S/he adds that feature creep “has always turned 
up in totalitarian states. And we don’t want that here”. P8 identifies a lack of 
oversight as troubling, noting that previously “you had to go and get permission if you 
wanted to monitor. And now you don’t have to get permission. […] Who agreed to 
that?” 
 
The participants consider the argument “If you have nothing to hide, then you have 
nothing to fear” as short-sighted and ideological. P1 believes that those who espouse 
this view “don’t live in London and don’t regularly see the variety of people I see 
[…], many of whom would not agree with that statement. They are stopped and 
searched every day probably in on their way or something”. P10 adds the subjective 
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element of secret service agents as a concern in this case and notes that “it becomes a 
problem if somebody in the government does not like me”.  
 
One participant expresses a somewhat different opinion, arguing that the mass of data 
generated in everyday life will not be of interest to secret services. P9: “I don’t feel 
strongly about Snowden. […] As a normal user, I don’t think I am important enough 
for the government to actually care about what I am looking at online. And I don’t 
have enough money for it to be worth it to hack into my bank account and so on. So 
personally I am not too concerned about monitoring in a way”. Also the quantity and 
complexity of available data would matter: “I can’t even see how one would look at 
each individual in the UK, in the world, and what they are doing and all the output 
that is coming out of it without using tools that filter and monitor. […] It will always 
be a sample of the population”. 
 
Other focus group participants disagree with the view that it is unlikely that the 
everyday citizen will be targeted. They argue that mass surveillance results in false 
positives and that this is precisely the problem. P10 considers this to be “the scary 
part because if you look at filters: […] Out of a 100 people, it will catch 99 criminals 
and one innocent person”. P6 refers to this as the “false positive/false negative-
problem”. P8 stresses the importance of the legal system for preventing such 
problems. P6 states in response that “[u]nfortunately the legal system has been 
circumvented by the [monitoring] systems”. P10 fears that a “guilty until proven 
innocent” approach may be adopted. P6 identifies these issues as “the ‘Who guards 
the guards?’-problem. It’s nothing new”. 
 
There was a clear sense in the focus groups that surveillance in the age of Snowden’s 
revelations is a huge problem that it is conducted on a mass scale without 
differentiation so that all citizens are treated as suspicious and as being potential 
terrorists. Besides categorical suspicion, warrantless blanket surveillance is according 
to the focus group participants also problematic. They mention that people’s opinions 
are monitored, which contains a strong totalitarian potential. Most participants 
consider the argument “If you have nothing to hide, then you have nothing to fear” as 
short-sighted, one-dimensional, and ideological. 
 
4.3. Political Responses to Mass Surveillance 
 
The third discussion topic focused on how the participating experts felt about political 
responses to mass surveillance.  
 
One possibility that some expert observers recommend in light of the existence of 
online mass surveillance systems such as Prism and XKeyscore are technological 
counter-measures so that code and technology become politics. Ann Cavoukian, a 
former Information and Privacy Commissioner in the Canadian province Ontario, is 
one of the main advocates of privacy by design and privacy-enhancing technologies. 
Privacy by design and privacy enhancement means according to Cavoukian that 
“privacy protections are engineered directly into the technology”17. 
                                                         
17 Ann Cavoukian, Transformative Technologies Deliver 
Both Security and Privacy: Think Positive-Sum not Zero-Sum. 
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/trans-tech.pdf  
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One privacy-enhancing technology is that private users and organisations make their 
online communication anonymous. Edward Snowden commented on this issue in an 
interview: “What last year’s revelations showed us was irrefutable evidence that 
unencrypted communications on the internet are no longer safe and cannot be trusted. 
Their integrity has been compromised and we need new security pro[grams] to protect 
them. Any communications that are transmitted over the Internet, over any networked 
line, should be encrypted by default”18.   
 
Snowden therefore argues that users should encrypt all of their online 
communications. One form of anonymisation is e-mail encryption. Available tools for 
email encryption include Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and the GNU Privacy Guard. In 
these systems, both the sender and the receiver use public and private encryption 
keys. If they use these keys, then they are the only ones who can read the e-mail 
content. Another privacy-enhancing technology is anonymous browsing. The most 
well known tool for anonymous browsing is the Tor web browser that anonymises IP 
addresses.  
 
We asked the focus group participants how they felt about privacy-enhancing 
technologies. They tend to think that privacy-enhancing technologies are an important 
response to mass surveillance. Yet P1 is concerned with “how realistic, manageable, 
or something similar it is, I don’t know. Anonymising. Whether it will work or not, I 
don’t know”. P4 cites his experience training other: “on the use of a Linux system 
called Tails. Tor is part of it. It can also assist in protecting e-mails as far as that’s 
possible”. However s/he also point to “a steep learning curve”, adding that [i]t is very 
difficult to train people”.  
 
Participants also point out that it is important that privacy-enhancing technologies 
have good usability and user experience. P8 notes that “[a] lot of things that would 
improve privacy are difficult to use. Most people can’t manage their own Facebook 
privacy settings”. Noting frustration with the fact that data is largely left under the 
control of those “who have a commercial interest in using it”, this respondent hopes 
“to see better tools for people to have ownership of their own data and to choose what 
they do. And the default place where that data sits is in a place that I have control of. 
And I can then choose to share it with these services”.  P6 responds by adding that 
“[t]here have been suggestions along these lines […] setting up a citizen digital ID, 
where you say: This is me and this is what I am prepared to share with this class of 
access […] And I think even the EU is looking at that. And that could be an answer”. 
 
One concept that the participants point out as particularly relevant is to move away 
from centralised data storage as in Google, Facebook, or cloud hosting, towards 
decentralised data storage that allows more privacy controls. P5 argues in this context 
that “[o]ur data might be out there, but we also have some ability to control that data 
or to say ‘That’s my data’. […] The data that was put up there, we could give 
preferences for how it should be used in certain contexts.” P4 anticipates that in the 
future, “we may have some mechanism by which we control the context of 
information we give and withdraw that consent at any time through such measures”. 
P5 agrees and identifies such a  feature as “contextual privacy”. In describing a                                                         
18 The Guardian Online, Transcript of an Interview with Edward Snowden. July 18, 2014 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-interview-
transcript  
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decentralised Internet, P10 identifies “data that […] no government or no single entity 
can hold. Then there is nobody that can use it for a purpose. And anybody who 
accesses that data, there is an audit blog entry of why that company or why that 
government body accesses that information. That is again public. So if somebody asks 
for my data for some reason, I can go to a judge and say: Look, something happened 
there”. P6 endorses this morphology that s/he terms “public justice”. 
 
One participant points also out that users should learn how to analyse data in order to 
address the monopolisation of this process by states, marketers, and online 
companies. The participant specifically discusses Maltego, an open source 
intelligence software that allows analysis and visualisation of open data, link analysis, 
and data mining. P4 supports “the idea of being able to start to use such tools for 
individuals because eventually, perhaps, you could start to see exactly where your 
position was regardless of where your data was on the planet. […] So I think there is 
some validity to the whole ‘Take it back’-philosophy”. Search engines and 
intelligence agencies would have far more complicated tools, but making these tools 
broadly available and offering the necessary education would nonetheless be a start.  
 
One criticism of privacy-enhancing technologies is that not everyone has the time, 
skills, and interest in educating him- or herself and for using such technologies. 
Another criticism is that advocating privacy-enhancing technologies is a form of 
techno-determinism that tries to find technological solutions to societal and political 
problems. The argument is that such solutions are insufficient because they do not 
challenge the underlying surveillance conducted by secret services, companies, or 
criminals, but just operate on the surface without challenging the root causes. 
 
The German public service broadcasting channels WDR and NDR revealed in July 
2014  that the US National Security Agency used XKeyscore and other surveillance 
programmes in order to identify who searched on the WWW for encryption 
technologies such as Tor or who visited the Tor website19. The NSA classifies users 
of tools such as Tor as “extremists”20. It for example monitored the German computer 
science student Sebastian Hahn and his servers because he operates one of the 5,000 
TOR encryption servers that are active on the WWW. The NSA tried to store all 
accesses to Hahn’s servers.  
 
This example shows that using privacy-enhancing technologies may encrypt the 
content of online communication, but that those who operate and use such 
technologies are considered as “extremists” by secret services and may therefore be 
put under surveillance . Moreover, the fact that they rely on these services can be a 
visible and discoverable fact, which undermines their intention to avoid scrutiny. 
 
The participants in the focus groups were not naïve techno-determinists. They do not                                                         
19 Quellcode entschlüsselt: Beweis für NSA-Spionage in Deutschland. NDR Online. July 3, 2014. 
http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/archiv/2014/Quellcode-entschluesselt-Beweis-fuer-NSA-Spionage-in-
Deutschland,nsa224.html. See also: Bruce Schneier: Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users’ online 
anonymity. The Guardian Online. October 4, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity  
20 XKeyscore: NSA beobachtet Anonymisierungs-Server von deutschem Studenten. Spiegel Online. 
July 3, 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/nsa-spaehte-tor-server-von-deutschem-
student-mit-xkeyscore-aus-a-978914.html  
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think there are technological fixes to political problems. They see privacy-enhancing 
technologies as only one dimension of political resistance and counter-measures to 
mass surveillance. P4, who teaches others how to use privacy-enhancing technologies, 
sees such educational measures as just one step and a starting point: “I find that an 
interesting beginning. But it is not the end of it. […] How you break down the 
intelligence hangover we got really from the post-war era. […] We are not going to 
dismantle that over night. And we are just going to continue to have a culture of post 
9/11 fear and control. So there don’t seem to be an easy way out of this until we grow 
out of that fear and out of that control”. 
 
The participants discuss the limits and problems of privacy-enhancing technologies. 
P3: “Even if you’re anonymised, you’ll go to the same websites. And eventually 
given enough processing power – and the US government does have infinite 
computational power – if they want to know about you, they are going to know about 
you. […] If you’re subject of a one-person NSA focus, they know everything about 
you. You have no chance”. P10 argues that one could try to create a lot of noise and 
false information on the Internet, but that doing so may especially create attention and 
raise suspicions: “If I wanted to create a certain image about me on the Internet, I 
could write a lot, I could put a lot of data points out there. And if lots of individuals 
share this the same as I do, then it will be difficult for somebody to figure out that 
[…] But again, doing all these things puts a red flag on: ‘Why is he trying so hard to 
hide? There is something definitely wrong’”.  
 
P6 and P7 argue that governments ai  to remove and break all encryption 
mechanisms by technological and legal measures:  
P7: “It’s a bit like if the government said: We are going to take away all the locks that 
people put on their own houses and we’ll put a lock there that we have a key to and 
other people might get that key too”. 
P6: “Public key cryptography is broken. It is useless” 
P7: “Snowden himself says that PGP [the encryption tool Pretty Good Privacy] still 
works”. 
P6: “Secure cryptography in the UK is not a problem for the state because you now 
got DRIP [the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014: an emergency law 
passed by British parliament in July 2014], which means that you have to hand over 
your encryption keys. It is required. And if you don’t, you go to prison. A couple of 
people have gone to prison”.  
 
The participants disagree on the question whether Tor is secure or not. P6 asserts that 
“Tor was written by the American navy. And it’s a honeypot to catch people and their 
communications to be monitored”. P7 and P8 disagree with P6’s view. P7 says that 
“it’s not insecure”. 
 
The law and the state constitute a realm of politics that goes beyond privacy-
enhancing technologies. Many participants in the focus groups felt that although 
current governments and state institutions have implemented mass surveillance with 
totalitarian potentials, the right kind of government could change the situation and put 
legal protections of citizens and users’ privacy into place and could limit the power of 
the police and secret services to conduct surveillance. P10 sees the need for 
legislation, they were concerned with the notion of “Who watches the watchers?”. P1 
also endorses the presence of laws, noting that while they may not always be 
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respected, they can at least “provide a benchmark and presumably hold somebody to 
account.” P6 acknowledges social complexities: “[M]ost people really want a 
peaceful life and no trouble and a government that delivers that to as many people as 
possible with minimum pain for all.” In his/her view, laws must be accompanied by 
“people in government that actually understand technology. […] The only way I can 
see to counter it is to put some legislative oversight by people who actually know 
what technologies mean”. However, the focus group participant also acknowledges 
that s/he does not “know how you get technical expertise into the government or 
generally throughout the economy.” 
 
Overall, there was a feeling among the focus group participants that currently British 
and international laws tend to predominantly protect the interests of communications 
companies, the police, and secret services, but that it is possible to create “stronger 
legislation to protect people” (P6). They indicated that they are rather sceptical about 
the British government’s reaction to Snowden’s revelations. An example is the Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIP) that was passed by British parliament 
in July 2014. P4 observed that suddenly “service providers such as social networking 
sites now come under the regards of telecommunications networks. So now they are 
required to give to whoever asks meta-data, whatever”. The governments in place 
would typically have short-term interests, lack technical expertise, and further extend 
surveillance so that the protection of citizens’ interests would be undermined. P10 
believes that “[g]overnments pass a few laws to appease the masses. More than 
anything else they look at what can I do so that four or five years from now, when 
there is a general election”. P10 is especially concerned with the long-term 
implications of supposedly short-term strategies: “And they can go back as far into 
the past as they want to. They have started to collect data from the early 2000s. […] If 
I am a teenager and I have done some stupid things in my past and if I am a different 
person now and it is 30 years after that happened. That shouldn’t have an impact on if 
I want to become the Prime Minister”.  
 
Data storage and processing is a matter of power. Some citizens argue that one must 
reduce or take away the power of those who can monitor users and empower the users 
themselves as well as organisations, political parties, and social movements that want 
to protect users’ data. A related opinion is that what we need most urgently are 
activism and protests against surveillance. An initiative called “Academics against 
Mass Surveillance” has for example initiated a petition, in which academics call for 
transparency and accountability of what secret services do. The Don’t Spy On Us-
coalition has “come together to fight back against the system of unfettered mass state 
surveillance that Edward Snowden exposed. Right now, the UK’s intelligence 
services are conducting mass surveillance that violates the right to privacy of Internet 
users and chills freedom of expression”. It is sceptical of the British government: 
“The current laws haven't stopped the intelligence services expanding their reach into 
our private lives. Don't Spy On Us is calling for an inquiry to investigate the extent to 
which the law has failed and suggest new legislation that will make the spooks 
accountable to our elected representatives, put an end to mass surveillance in line with 
our 6 principles and let judges not the Home Secretary decide when spying is 
justified”21. 
                                                         
21 https://www.dontspyonus.org.uk/about    
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In Summer 2014, the hacker group Anonymous called for a mass protest at a 
Cheltenham-based surveillance post of the GCHQ, the British secret service that 
according to Edward Snowden has collaborated with the NSA in conducting Internet 
surveillance and that apparently as part of the Tempora programme listens in on fibre-
optic cables in order to extract personal data of Internet users and shares these data 
with the NSA22. Anonymous’ call concluded: “The tyranny must end, 1984 was not 
an instruction manual.  DEMAND YOUR FREEDOM BACK!!!” 
 
We asked the participants in the focus groups how they feel about civil society and 
protest movements as responses to mass surveillance. P4 offers the one-word 
descriptor “[viable]”, adding that “[i]t’s bizarre that over the last few years, especially 
meetings such as the one of the Chaos Computer Club, who get together every year.  
Until recently in Berlin, there were 600-700 people, all men wearing black, with 
severe dietary malfunctions. Now, this year, the same event in Hamburg, and an 
explosion of different people, not white male geeks interested in Plan 9 or BSD”. So 
one can now observe a much wider “scope of those who want to understand the 
impact of these subjects as well as technology and/or alternative ways of making, so 
the whole maker scene is blurring to this as well. I found a social interest in this area 
to have exploded. And I think that’s great and we gotta keep going”.  
 
P5 notes that greater transparency will incite society to “push back.” Likewise, P1 
considers it a welcome change that citizens “are starting to stand up and anything that 
can give them the means to use technology to protest and make their voice heard is 
welcome”. P3 argues that the general political climate in the world is conducive for 
mass protests: “In total there is properly popular uprising. And I am not talking about 
a hundred guys in Guy Fawkes masks. I am talking about truly popular uprising that 
forces governmental change. We are still fighting a losing battle when we are talking 
about privacy, no matter what. We talk about the government, any government, 
certainly any European government, […] has the power to figure out everything they 
want to know about you. They have the resources. Far more resources than you ever 
gonna have. […] People, […] even though they agree to what is being exchanged for 
terms of privacy or whatever else, they don’t understand the scope of it. And it’s that 
scope that we’ll hopefully convince them that something is wrong and they can do 
something about it”. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Social media are convergent media in two respects (Fuchs and Trottier 2013): 1) They 
enable the convergence of the social activities of producing and sharing information, 
communicating, collaborating, and engaging with communities on single platforms. 
2) They also reflect and further advance the convergence of different social roles: On 
social media like Facebook, we act in various roles. But all of these roles become 
mapped onto single profiles that are observed by different people who are associated 
with our different social roles. On Facebook, your “friends” are family members, 
people you are close with, colleagues from work, ephemeral acquaintances, and 
strangers.  
 
Social media reflect complex changes of society that have resulted in a liquefaction                                                         
22 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempora  
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and blurring of boundaries between public/private, social/individual, labour/leisure, 
office/home, production/consumption, labour/play, etc. (Fuchs 2014c). Zygmunt 
Bauman (2002/2012, 2005) argues that liquidity is the main feature of life and society 
in modernity. Whereas it is an overarching claim to say that liquidity is the central 
feature of modernity, it is certainly one of its aspects (Fuchs 2014c) that has also 
affected the way communication is organised. In respect to surveillance, Bauman and 
Lyon (2013) therefore speak of the emergence of liquid surveillance. “Surveillance 
spreads in hitherto unimaginable ways, responding to and reproducing liquidity. 
Without a fixed container, but jolted by ‘security’ demands and tipped by technology 
companies’ insistent marketing, surveillance spills out all over” (Bauman and Lyon 
2013, 9). 
 
Technologies are not the cause of these changes, but a field, where these changes and 
resulting contradictions unfold. The convergence of social activities and roles on 
social media results in the fact that the processed data reveals close pictures of most 
aspects of our lives. The access to a mass of data about converging activities in 
converging social roles is the reason why both Internet companies such as Facebook 
and Google (the world’s largest advertising agencies) as well as repressive state 
institutions have such a huge interest in monitoring social media data. The focus 
groups we conducted discussed both corporate and state surveillance of social media 
as well as another form convergence that Edward Snowden uncovered: the 
convergence of state and corporate surveillance of the Internet and social media. 
 
The focus groups conducted with data and computer experts showed that these 
professionals are highly sceptical of Internet and social media surveillance. They 
argue that data protection is an important principle that profit-driven companies often 
disregard; that many terms of use and privacy policies are complex, vague, 
euphemistic, ideological, loaded, and deceptive; and they pointed out that giving 
informed and explicit consent to data processing and the processing of sensitive 
personal data has become more difficult because of the global and networked nature 
of data, cloud computing, changing contexts of data, and inferences that algorithms 
draw from meta-data. Targeted online advertising is at the heart of many large social 
media companies’ capital accumulation model. The focus groups showed the 
controversial and contradictory nature of targeted online advertising.  
 
The vast majority of the focus group participants feel Edward Snowden has done the 
right thing, even though he thereby broke US law, and that his revelations have been 
important for uncovering the extent of mass surveillance of the Internet that has been 
going on. Many of them indicate that Snowden’s revelations have shown that we live 
in a mass surveillance society with totalitarian potentials. There was a sense in the 
focus groups that it is a huge problem that surveillance is conducted as mass 
surveillance without differentiation, that surveillance is not just targeted at actual 
criminals and terrorists who are under suspicion, but that everyone is treated as 
suspicious and as being a terrorist. Besides categorical suspicion also blanket 
surveillance of single individuals without a warrant would be very problematic. The 
participants mentioned that people’s opinions are monitored, which would have a 
strong totalitarian potential. Most participants considered the argument “If you got 
nothing to hide, then you got nothing to fear“ as short-sighted, one-dimensional and 
ideological. 
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Computing is based on a deterministic logic, in which reality is always calculable and 
has at each point of time a clear, one-dimensional binary status (either zero or one).  
Georg Lukács (1971, 131) argues that with the rise of capitalism, “human relations 
(viewed as the objects of social activity) assume increasingly the objective forms of 
the abstract elements of the conceptual systems of natural science and of the abstract 
substrata of the laws of nature”. The economy thereby became “transformed into an 
abstract and mathematically orientated system of formal ‘laws’” (105) that is 
governed by “the abstract, quantitative mode of calculability” (93). Max Horkheimer 
(1947) termed such thought instrumental reason. Herbert Marcuse (1964) spoke of 
technological rationality. The one-dimensional logic of calculability makes engineers 
prone to define society in terms of machine logic, to neglect contradictory thought 
that does not define the world in the logic of either/or, and to advocate technological 
fixes to political problems. An important result of the conducted study was that it 
provided indications that computer professionals do not view surveillance after 
Snowden as a technological, but a political problem and that they do not advocate 
technological fixes (the use privacy enhancing technologies), but political changes. 
 
Overall, the participants in the focus groups feel it is important that there are political 
responses to the totalitarian potentials of mass surveillance that Edward Snowden 
revealed. They do not favour an approach that only relies on a single political 
dimension such as technology, law, or social movements’ protests, but rather take an 
“anything goes” approach that advocates that any measure, strategy, and initiative that 
questions and aims at driving back mass surveillance is important, should be 
attempted and supported.  
 
Two focus groups are not a large enough sample for generalising the findings. 
However, the research results show some very clear tendencies, which are an 
empirical indication that many computer and data experts are highly political and 
critical when it comes to questions of surveillance. The participating data and 
computer experts question the combination of corporate and state power that has 
resulted in a system of mass surveillance. They support the combination of various 
levels of resistance against such surveillance. They are not naïve techno-determinists 
and therefore do not simply propagate technological solutions, such as a sole focus on 
privacy-enhancing technologies. They see that there are no technological fixes to 
political problems. At the same time they also believe that it is very important not to 
neglect the technological dimension and that technological expertise is important for 
questioning and struggling against the surveillance-industrial complex.  
 
The participants point out the limits of privacy-enhancing technologies such as secret 
services’ vast computing power that is used to break encryption, the legal 
requirements to reveal encryption keys, and the suspicion that using privacy-
enhancing technologies creates suspicion so that such users may especially be subject 
to surveillance. At the same time they feel that educating users on how to use privacy-
enhancing technologies and open data analysis is an important form of empowerment 
in the struggle against the surveillance-industrial complex.  
 
The participants in the conducted research think that it is important to strengthen laws 
that truly protect citizens, watch and limit the powers of the watchers, prohibit 
categorical surveillance, and only allow surveillance of single individuals who are 
under suspicion and with the help of a judicial warrant. At the same time they feel that 
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many governments’ reactions to Snowden’s revelations, including the British 
government, included the implementation of even more surveillance and further 
limitation of citizens’ rights. In particular, they discussed the UK Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2014. This scepticism towards the state does not mean that 
the focus group participants think that the law and the state cannot be reformed. To 
the contrary, the respondents feel that a government that truly cares about citizens can 
bring constructive change. They simply have the impression that many governments 
at the moment fall completely short of protecting citizens and only protect security 
agencies’ interests in implementing conservative law and order politics that are based 
on the ideology that more policing and more surveillance is a solution to complex 
political and socio-economic problems such as crime and terrorism. One participant 
for example remarks in the feedback questionnaire: “Valuable discussion. How does 
this get into government?”. This participant thereby expresses that citizens getting 
together, as in the focus groups, generate viable ideas for solutions, but governments 
at the moment do not take these citizen interests into account. The participant stresses 
the importance of civil society action and protest movements that aim at creating 
public awareness and exert pressure for political change.  
 
Edward Snowden’s revelations about the existence of surveillance systems such as 
Prism, XKeyScore, and Tempora have shed new light on the extension and intensity 
of state institutions’ Internet and social media surveillance. But these are not just 
phenomena of state power, but also of corporate power. The concept of the military-
industrial complex stresses the existence of collaborations between private 
corporations and the state’s institutions of internal and external defence in the security 
realm. C. Wright Mills argued in 1956 that there is a power elite that connects 
economic, political, and military power: “There is no longer, on the one hand, an 
economy, and, on the other hand, a political order containing a military establishment 
unimportant to politics and to money-making. There is a political economy linked, in 
a thousand ways, with military institutions and decisions. […] there is an ever-
increasing interlocking of economic, military, and political structures” (Mills 1956, 7-
8). 
 
Edward Snowden has confirmed that the military-industrial complex contains a 
surveillance-industrial complex (Hayes 2012), into which social media are entangled: 
Facebook and Google each have more than 1 billion users and have likely amassed 
the largest collection of personal data in the world. They and other private social 
media companies are first and foremost advertising companies that appropriate and 
commodify data on users’ interests, communications, locations, online behaviour and 
social networks. They make profit out of data that users’ online activities generate. 
They continuously monitor usage behaviour for this economic purpose. Since 9/11 
there has been a massive intensification and extension of surveillance that is based on 
the naïve technological-deterministic surveillance ideology that monitoring 
technologies, big data analysis and predictive algorithms can prevent terrorism. The 
reality of the murder of a soldier that took place in the South-East London district of 
Woolwich in May 2013 shows that terrorists can use low-tech tools such as machetes 
for targeted killings. High-tech surveillance will never be able to stop terrorism 
because most terrorists are smart enough not to announce their intentions on the 
Internet. It is precisely this surveillance ideology that has created intelligence 
agencies’ interest in the big data held by social media corporations. Evidence has 
shown that social media surveillance not just targets terrorists, but has also been 
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directed at protestors and civil society activists23. State institutions and private 
corporations have long collaborated in intelligence, but the access to social media has 
taken the surveillance-industrial complex to a new dimension: It is now possible to 
obtain detailed access to a multitude of citizens’ activities in converging social roles 
conducted in converging social spaces.  
 
Yet the profits made by social media corporations are not the only economic 
dimension of the contemporary surveillance-industrial complex: The NSA has 
subcontracted and outsourced surveillance tasks to approximately 2,000 private 
security companies24 that make profits by spying on citizens. Booz Allen Hamilton, 
the private security company that Edward Snowden worked for until recently, is just 
one of these firms that follow the strategy of accumulation-by-surveillance. 
According to financial data25, it had 24 500 employees in 2012 and its profits 
increased from US$ 25 million in 2010 to 84 million in 2011, 239 million in 2012, 
219 million in 2013, 232 million in 2014, and 233 million in 2015. Surveillance is big 
business, both for online companies and those conducting the online spying for 
intelligence agencies. 
 
Users create data on the Internet that is either private, semi-public and public. In the 
social media surveillance-industrial complex, companies commodify and privatise 
user data as private property and secret services such as the NSA driven by a techno-
determinist ideology obtain access to the same data for trying to catch terrorists that 
may never use these technologies for planning attacks. For organising surveillance, 
the state makes use of private security companies that derive profits from organising 
the monitoring process.  
 
User data is in the surveillance-industrial complex first externalised and made public 
or semi-public on the Internet in order to enable users’ communication processes, then 
privatised as private property by Internet platforms in order to accumulate capital, and 
finally particularised by secret services who bring massive amounts of data under 
their control that is made accessible and analysed worldwide with the help of profit-
making security companies. 
 
The UK focus groups provided indications that many computer and data professionals 
are outraged and feel deep unease about the existence of the surveillance-industrial 
complex. They do not want an Internet that is controlled by companies and state 
institutions. Many of them rather argue for an alternative Internet that is controlled by 
civil society and the users and citizens themselves. Participant P7 for example 
concludes that “[i]f this is the way that governments and intelligence agencies want to 
go, it is a race to the bottom, the bottom being everyone spying on everyone else and 
no one being secure. The rational thing to do is to invest in  […] creating secure 
systems that are public infrastructures […] Investment in public digital infrastructure 
that anyone can use, that is open source, that is decentralised, etc. That would be a 
good way to go. That should be coupled with regulation and new laws as well”.                                                          
23 Spying on Occupy activists. The Progressive Online. June 2013.  
http://progressive.org/spying-on-ccupy-activists  
24 A hidden world, growing beyond control. Washington Post Online.  
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-
control/  
25 SEC Filings, http://investors.boozallen.com/sec.cfm 





























































Journal of Information, Communication & Ethics in Society
 
The alternative to a politically-economically controlled Internet is a commons-based 
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Appendix: Focus Group Interview Guide 
 
Before the Start 
 
The moderator and his/her assistant welcome the participants, assign a seat to them, 
provide a name tag to them that stands in front of them on the table and besides their 
names also shows their institutions. The ideal setting is that a round-table can be used.  
 
An informed consent form and an information sheet containing basic information 
about PACT is distributed to each participant after arrival. S/he is asked to read the 
material, if s/he has any questions or comments on it, and to sign the form.  
 
[Distribution of two information sheets] 
 
Explain to each participant that refreshments are available and they are welcome to 
take drinks and food. 
 
Explain also to each participant that the focus groups will be audio- and video-
recorded and that this makes the analysis easier.  
 
Part 1: Start/Introduction 
 
Welcome to this focus group. Thanks a lot for agreeing to participate. We much 
appreciate that you took time out of your surely busy schedule to come here and 
contribute. We welcome your contributions and inputs to our research. 
 
My name is Christian Fuchs and I will be moderating this group discussion. I am a 
professor of digital and social media research here at the University of Westminster. I 
will be assisted by Daniel Trottier, who will take notes and take care of technology. 
 
Our session will take about two hours with a short refreshment break after about one 
hour. Since we will be audio and video-recording the discussion, I would kindly ask 
you to speak in a clear voice; your opinions, experiences and suggestions are very 
important to this research, and we do not want to miss any of your comments. 
 
We will audio- and video-record the discussion, but these recordings are for internal 
use by the research team only, which makes it easier for us to analyse the results. We 
will not publish the audio and video recordings.  
 
In the research reports we publish, we want to quote from what you say in the 
discussion. But this will be fully anonymous. We will not mention your names, the 
names of the organisations you work for, or any other identifiable details. We will 
only say what kinds of organisations have participated, i.e. the fields or industries 
they come from. So the recorded comments might be used in scientific publications 
and reports, but only as anonymous quotes. There will be no possible way to identify 
you on the basis of the documented information. In order to ensure the latter, you will 
be assigned a number or letter in the report (e.g. respondent A), and only this symbol 
will be used in the reports. 
 
The research we are conducting is part of the European Union research project 
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“PACT: Public Perception of Security and Privacy”, in which 10 research teams study 
the role of privacy and surveillance in Europe. You can get further information about 
the project and read some of its reports by visiting its website 
http://www.projectpact.eu.  
 
As a token of appreciation for your participation, we will give to each of you at the 
end of the focus group a printed version of three of our research reports that we hope 
can help your organisation to make better sense of issues that relate to privacy and 
personal data. You will be among the first people from the public getting access to 
them and we hope your organisations can benefit from the information obtained. 
 
[Bound hard copies of the PACT deliverable reports D1.4, D5.1 and D5.2 are 
distributed to the participants at the end of the focus group]  
 
A focus group is a structured discussion on a specific topic, in our case privacy and 
security. There are a couple of simple, but important rules, that we should observe in 
order to make it a good discussion: 
• We are interested in the opinion of each individual and we would therefore like to 
hear from all the people in the group. 
• There are no wrong or right answers. There are only different opinions. 
Consequently, it is important that we mutually respect each other's opinions. At the 
same time, it is unlikely that everyone agrees on the issues discussed. You are 
encouraged to articulate disagreements with what others say on specific issues we 
discuss. 
• It is important for us that only one person speaks at a time. Each opinion is 
important and I would kindly request that you don't speak when others are 
speaking, otherwise it will be difficult for us to capture all of your opinions. 
• I would also kindly request that you silence your mobile phones and thus provide 
for an uninterrupted discussion. 
• In the focus group discussion, we are interested both in your personal opinions and 
in the actual practices and opinions you have encountered in organisations and 
companies you have worked in or with. 
 
Do you have any comments or other suggestions or general questions before we start? 
….  
So, let us start with all members of the group briefly introducing themselves. I will 
start and we’ll then go around the table. Maybe we can say our names, a bit about 
your work or studies, your organisations or universities, and what you do. All of you 
have a common interest in computing and the Internet. 
  
Let me start by introducing myself  
….  
[Go around the table and let the participants introduce themselves] 
 
Part 2: Ethical Values and Societal Dimensions 
 
One important aspect of assessing information technologies has to do with ethics. 
Ethics discusses what principles we can use for deciding what appropriate and 
inappropriate actions are in contemporary society. We have tried to identify and 
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specify ethical values that are important to be respected in the design, implementation 
and use of information technologies. We want to now present some of these values to 
you, discuss with you how they relate to technology, and how they matter.  
 
Part 2.1. Sensitive Personal Data 
 
One issue that is important when dealing with the ethics of digital data is so-called 
sensitive personal data. Our research has identified the ethical importance of handling 
sensitive personal data in responsible manner.  
 
We have prepared an information sheet that shows you the legal definition of 
sensitive personal data that is used in the United Kingdom. The same kind of 
definition is used in all European Union countries. Let’s have a look at the definition. 
 
[Distribution of an information sheet to the participants. The moderator reads and 
explains the definition] 
 
So for example the information “He lives in the United Kingdom” is not sensitive 
personal data. The information “He is an HIV-positive, Protestant man who supports 
the Labour Party” is sensitive personal data because it contains health-related, 
religious and political data.  
 
Part 2.1.1. Sensitive Personal Data in the Participants’ Organisations 
 
Sensitive personal data involves data about a person’s ethnicity, political opinions, 
religious and other beliefs, membership in trade unions and political groups, health 
data, sexual orientations and interests, biometrical identifiers, and criminal 
convictions.  
 
ICT professionals and scientists studying computing and data often develop or use 
information technologies that process personal data. I am wondering if you have been 
confronted by users with the question if and how to store or process sensitive personal 
data. Which approaches do you or your organisations take in respect to this issue?  
We are interested in both your personal and your organisations or research group’s 




Part 2.1.2. Google and Sensitive Personal Data in Targeted Advertising 
 
Let us assume I want to market the University of Westminster’s website on Google in 
order to try to get more students. So I use behavioural advertising on Google for this 
purpose to target specific groups. Behavioural advertising is advertising that makes 
use of specific behaviours of users, for example which keywords they type into 
Google.  
 
We have prepared a video that shows how such ads are set up. Let us have a look at it. 
 
[The moderator shows a prepared video and explains what the participants can see 
there] 
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So my aim is to target the ad at people who are interested in the Labour Party, 
Protestantism, or HIV. These are issues relating to politics, religion, and health. So 
they are quite sensitive. It is just a hypothetical example. In reality the University of 
Westminster does not run such ads.  
 
What are your opinions: Should it be possible for me to run such an ad? Should I be 





2.1.3. Google’s Privacy Policy and Privacy Regulations in Respect to Targeted 
Advertising: The Role of Opt-Out 
 
Let's have a look at how Google regulates such issues in its privacy policy. You also 
find this information on another information sheet we have prepared. 
 
[The moderator distributes an information sheet] 
 
Google’s current privacy policy (version from March 31, 2014) says: 
“When showing you tailored ads, we will not associate a cookie or anonymous 
identifier with sensitive categories, such as those based on race, religion, sexual 
orientation or health”. 
Cookies are small files stores on users’ computers in order to identify that they have 
visited specific websites. Anonymous identifiers are similar to cookies, but used on 
specific technologies, for example particular mobile phones. 
 
So Google says it does not store cookies if I visit a sensitive website. It does however 
not rule out to use sensitive keywords for targeted ads. 
The privacy policy also specifies: 
“People have different privacy concerns. Our goal is to be clear about what 
information we collect, so that you can make meaningful choices about how it is used. 
For example, you can: 
   Review and control certain types of information tied to your Google Account by 
using Google Dashboard.  
   View and edit your ads preferences about the ads shown to you on Google and 
across the web, such as which categories might interest you, using Ads Settings. You 
can also opt out of certain Google advertising services here”. 
 
So there seem to be mechanisms that can enable me to opt out so that Google does not 
use my interests that I reveal in keywords for advertising.  
Let us have a look at how this works. We have prepared another video for this 
purpose. 
 
[The moderator shows the participants a prepared video and explains what they see 
there] 
 
So the video shows us how I can delete certain searches from my search history and 
that I can disable Google to use my search keywords for advertising. How do you feel 
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about these so-called opt-out mechanisms? Do you feel the availability of such a 
deletion function and an opt-out is a sufficient privacy protection or rather not? How 




Part 2.1.4. Targeted Advertising: Opt-In or Opt-Out – What is Better? 
 
Various surveys have shown that users feel quite uncomfortable about targeted 
advertising. 
 
[do not read, just as additional information for the moderator: In 2011, the European 
Union carried out at a European-wide survey. It focused on how citizens think about 
data protection. One question was how comfortable they were with the fact that there 
are websites that “use information about your online activity to tailor advertisements 
or content to your hobbies and interests?”26. 54% of the respondents felt 
uncomfortable about it, 39% comfortable, 7% had no clear opinion. A survey carried 
out by Razorfish in 2014 shows that 78% of the UK respondents feel that targeted ads 
on the mobile Internet are a privacy invasion27.] 
 
The Article 29 Working Party is a group of data protection commissioners and experts 
set up by the European Union. It publishes opinions and recommendations about 
privacy and data protection issues. In 2010 it consulted on the topic of online 
advertising and then published its opinion and some recommendations28. Its opinion is 
that many users do not know about opting-out and that opt-out is not a real consent 
because passivity of the user does not necessarily imply agreement and is not an 
active participation in expressing agreement. The Article 29 Working Party concludes 
that ad network providers “should swiftly move away from opt out mechanisms and 
create prior opt in mechanisms” (23) and that mentioning “the practice of 
behavioural advertising in general terms and conditions and/or privacy policies can 
never suffice” (24).  
 
The advertising industry has a different opinion. The European Advertising Standards 
Alliance and the Interactive Advertising Bureau argue that opt-in approaches are 
“disruptive for users”29 and that such mechanisms “are not of comparable privacy 
value to users” and can have “severe negative economic impact n a legitimate 
business activity”30 of advertisers. They prefer opt-out, as e.g. in the case of Google 
that we saw. 
 
I am wondering what your opinions are on opt-in to vs. opt-out of targeted online                                                         
26 Special Eurobarometer 359: Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European 
Union. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf   
27 http://www.thedrum.com/news/2014/06/30/three-quarters-mobile-users-see-targeted-adverts-
invasion-privacy-says-razorfish  
28 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 




30 IAB Europe and EASA: Letter to Article 29 Working Party. January 17, 2012. 
http://www.iabeurope.eu/download_file/977/211    
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advertising. Should it better be organised as an opt-in, where the standard setting is 
that sensitive and other personal data is not used for targeted advertising, or opt-out, 
where the standard setting is that such data is used for targeted ads, and the users can 
go to a page, where they can deactivate such usage? Can you please also try to give 




Part 3. Edward Snowden 
 
Can you for a minute think about which personal data that is stored by an IT system, 
application or platform that you use in your organisation, for work, for your studies, 
or in private life, or that you study in your research and write down a list of stored 
data onto the notepad that lies in front of you.  
 
So I think you all have now written down some of specific personal data. Let’s maybe 
go around the table so that everyone can report about the system she has chosen and 
what s/he has written down. 
 




In June 2013, Edward Snowden has with support of the Guardian revealed the 
existence of the global Internet surveillance system Prism that is operated by secret 
services such as the NSA in the USA and GCHQ in the UK in collaboration with 
communication companies such as AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, 
Paltalk, Skype, and Yahoo!. He also revealed the existence of a surveillance system 
called XKeyScore that the NSA can use for reading e-mails, track web browsing, 
phone calls, and online contact networks, and follow the screens of individual 
computers.  
Here are short video excerpts, in which Snowden explains what Prism and 
XKeyScore are: 
 
[Display of a 5 minute video, in which Snowden explains his leaks and revelations]  
 
Let us now assume that a security agency actually demands that it gets access to the 
ICT system you have chosen before and to some or all of the personal user data stored 
in it. Let us assume they use the systems that Snowden talks about. How severe a 
privacy violation do you think the users would consider this monitoring if they knew 
about it?  How do you in general assess Snowden’s revelations? 
I suggest that we again go round the table and that each of you tells us something 
about how you expect your users would react if they heard about the state monitoring 




Part 4. Control of Privacy Threats 
 
If one has identified data protection and other risks for users, then the question arises 
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what can be done about it. The literature on the control of privacy threats identifies 
technical and organisational measures that can be taken. 
 
Let us first discuss some possible technical measures. 
 
Part 4.1. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
 
One possibility that some experts recommend in light of the existence of the Prism 
and XKeyscore surveillance technologies are technological counter-measures. Ann 
Cavoukian, a former Information and Privacy Commissioner in the Canadian 
province Ontario, as well as many other data protection experts advocate the concepts 
of privacy by design and privacy-enhancing technologies. Privacy by design and 
privacy enhancement means according to Cavoukian that “privacy protections are 
engineered directly into the technology”31. 
 
One privacy-enhancing technology is that private users and organisations make their 
online communication anonymous. Edward Snowden commented on this issue in an 
interview: 
 
“What last year’s revelations showed us was irrefutable evidence that unencrypted 
communications on the internet are no longer safe and cannot be trusted. Their 
integrity has been compromised and we need new security pro[grams] to protect 
them. Any communications that are transmitted over the internet, over any networked 
line, should be encrypted by default. That’s what last year showed us”32. 
 
So Snowden argues that users should encrypt all of their online communication. One 
form of anonymisation is e-mail encryption. Available tools for email encryption 
include Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and the GNU Privacy Guard. In these systems, 
both the sender and the receiver use public and private encryption keys and if they use 
them, then they are the only ones who can read the e-mail content.  
 
Another privacy-enhancing technology is anonymous browsing. When users browse 
the WWW, they are identifiable by their IP address. Data protectionists consider an IP 
address to be personally identifiable information. The most well known tool for 
anonymous browsing is the TOR web browser that anonymises IP addresses.  
 
We have prepared a handout that shows how TOR works. 
 
[The moderator distributes a handout]  
 
So TOR generates random paths over encrypted servers in order to reach WWW 
pages.  
 
TOR describes its benefits the following way: “Journalists use Tor to communicate                                                         
31 Ann Cavoukian, Transformative Technologies Deliver 
Both Security and Privacy: 
Think Positive-Sum not Zero-Sum. http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/trans-tech.pdf  
32 The Guardian Online, Transcript of an Interview with Edward Snowden. July 18, 2014 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-interview-
transcript  
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more safely with whistleblowers and dissidents. Non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) use Tor to allow their workers to connect to their home website while they're 
in a foreign country, without notifying everybody nearby that they're working with 
that organization. […] Activist groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
recommend Tor as a mechanism for maintaining civil liberties online. Corporations 
use Tor as a safe way to conduct competitive analysis, and to protect sensitive 
procurement patterns from eavesdroppers”33. 
 
I am wondering what opinions you have about privacy-enhancing technologies? Do 
you think that they are a good means for overcoming surveillance threats posed by 
secret services and other organisations or people monitoring the Internet. Can you 




Do you or your organisations use specific forms of privacy-enhancing technologies? 
If so, which ones? Or did you have discussions in your organisations or with friends, 









Part 4.2. Criticisms of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
 
Hackers dedicated to privacy protection organise so-called crypto parties, which are 
public events, where computer experts teach lay users how to use encryption tools. 
CryptoParty London regularly organises such events. 
 
One criticism of privacy-enhancing technologies is that not everyone has the time, 
skills and interest in educating him- or herself and using such technologies. Another 
criticism is that advocating privacy-enhancing technologies is a form of techno-
determinism that tries to find technological solutions to social and political problems. 
The argument is that such solutions are insufficient because they do not challenge the 
underlying surveillance conducted by secret services, companies, or criminals, but 
just operates on the surface without challenging the root causes. 
 
The German public service broadcasting channels WDR and NDR have in July 2014 
revealed that the US National Security Agency used the XKeyScore and other 
surveillance programme in order to identify who searches on the WWW for 
encryption technologies such as TOR or who visits the TOR website34. The NSA                                                         
33 https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en 
34 Quellcode entschlüsselt: Beweis für NSA-Spionage in Deutschland. NDR Online. July 3, 2014. 
http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/archiv/2014/Quellcode-entschluesselt-Beweis-fuer-NSA-Spionage-in-
Deutschland,nsa224.html. See also: Bruce Schneier: Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users’ online 
anonymity. The Guardian Online. October 4, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity  
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classifies users of tools such as TOR as “extremists” and especially monitors them35. 
It for example monitored the German computer science student Sebastian Hahn and 
his servers because he operates one of the 5,000 TOR encryption servers that are 
active on the WWW. The NSA tried to store all accesses to Hahn’s servers.  
 
The example shows that using privacy-enhancing technologies may encrypt the 
content of online communication, but that those who operate and use such 
technologies are considered as “extremists” by secret services and may therefore 
especially be monitored.  
 
I am wondering how you feel about these criticisms that privacy-enhancing 
technologies are just technocratic attempts that do nothing against the existence of 




Part 4.3. Political and Organisational Alternatives to Privacy-Enhancing 
Technologies 
 
An alternative to privacy-enhancing technologies that is being discussed is to change 
the whole organisation and regulation of how data is being stored. Data storage and 
processing is a matter of power. So some argue that one must reduce or take away the 
power of those who can monitor users and empower the users themselves and 
organisations, political parties and social movements who want to protect users’ data. 
Some privacy advocates therefore argue that what we need most urgently are activism 
and protests against surveillance. They argue that we need political and organisational 
solutions.  
 
An initiative called “Academics against Mass Surveillance” has for example initiated 
a petition, in which academics call for transparency and accountability of what secret 
services do.  
 
The hacker group Anonymous has called for a mass protest at a Cheltenham-based 
surveillance post of the GCHQ, the British secret service that according to Edward 
Snowden has collaborated with the NSA in conducting Internet surveillance and that 
apparently as part of the Tempora programme listens in on fibre-optic cables in order 
to extract personal data of Internet users and shares these data with the NSA36. 
 
The protest call said: “Between the 29th of August and the 1st of September 2014 the 
people will be holding a mass protest out side of GCHQ in Cheltenham, England to 
continue their campaign against the mass public surveillance employed by many of 
the worlds Governments, including the UK's. While we are told this measure worthy 
of Orwell is for our own protection we feel that this is simply another lie spun to us 
and that this massive invasion of privacy is nothing but a method of gathering 
intelligence to allow greater control of the worlds civil population. The tyranny must 
end, 1984 was not an instruction manual.  DEMAND YOUR FREEDOM                                                         
35 XKeyscore: NSA beobachtet Anonymisierungs-Server von deutschem Studenten. Spiegel Online. 
July 3, 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/nsa-spaehte-tor-server-von-deutschem-
student-mit-xkeyscore-aus-a-978914.html  
36 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempora  
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BACK...!!!” 
 
In the end, such protests aim at forbidding legally that certain data are monitored by 
secret services. They argue for restrictions on or the outlawing of the development 
and use of specific surveillance technologies. They argue that citizens should only 
vote for parties that support privacy and oppose surveillance measures. They argue for 
a stronger political control of secret services by independent authorities or for the 
abolishment of secret services. And they speak in favour of changing data protection 
laws so that they require maximum privacy protection, storage of a minimum of data 
for a minimum period of time, i.e. only to the extent necessary for operating IT 
services, the decentralisation of data storage, etc.  
 
I am wondering what your opinions are about such political movements, protests and 




When you consider the measures we have discussed – privacy-enhancing 
technologies, changing existing laws, political protests, outlawing surveillance 
technologies, abolishing secret services: Which ones do you think are most relevant 
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